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CASE COMMENTS

trial judges are authorized to require special verdicts from the jury.4 1
The decision does not address itself to problems of actual procedure
that may arise in the application of comparative negligence, but rather
grants to the trial courts "broad discretion in adopting such procedure
as may accomplish the objectives and purposes expressed in this
42
opinion.
The questions remaining now appear to be ones of practical application. How well will the courts succeed in the new task of fairly
apportioning damages? Will the "pure" form of comparative negligence
prove workable in Florida or will the court perhaps have to consider
adopting one of the modified approaches that prevail in other comparative negligence states? Whatever the answers may be, the main
problem has been met: contributory negligence as a bar survives no
longer. The court has taken a major step toward the perfection of a
more just and equitable system of compensation in Florida.
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A passer-by reported to the police that a breaking and entering was
in progress at a food store. The police dispatcher made radio contact
with Officer Robert Anderson, who was patrolling the area, and informed him of the reported activity. Anderson was instructed to proceed to the food store and to secure the area. While in route to the
food store Anderson encountered an automobile, driven by defendant
Jetmore, traveling at a high rate of speed in the direction of the city
limits. Anderson stopped the defendant, informed him that a breaking
and entering was being investigated, and ordered him to get out of the
car and to place his hands on the roof of the car. As the defendant did

41. 280 So. 2d at 439. The special verdict can be used by the jury to determine the
percentage of negligence attributable to each party and also the amount of damage
sustained by each party. The court would then compute the proper amount of recovery,
if any, for the plaintiff. The absence of such "special verdicts" in Mississippi has been
criticized as a major fault in its "pure" form system because it has proven difficult to
determine whether juries are basing recovery on percentage of fault or on percentage of
damage. See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 475-476 (1970); Heft & Heft, The TwoLayer Cake: No Fault and Comparative Negligence, 58 A.B.A.J. 933 (1972).
42. 280 So. 2d at 440.
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so, Anderson noticed that he was trying to conceal a key in the palm
of his hand. When he ascertained that the key was to the trunk of the
defendant's auto, Anderson asked for, and was refused, permission to
search the trunk. He searched it anyway and found food from the store
in question. Defendant was then arrested and taken to the police station
where he was given the Miranda warnings and where, approximately
forty-five minutes after his arrest, he signed a confession. Jetmore later
testified that he confessed because he had concluded that "the police
had sufficient evidence to convict him anyway."'
Prior to trial the defendant filed two motions to suppress evidence.
First, he moved to suppress the tangible evidence seized from the
trunk of his automobile on the ground that the search and seizure was
illegal. Secondly, he moved to suppress his confession on the ground
that it was a fruit of the illegal search and arrest. The trial court
granted the motion to suppress the tangible evidence, but ruled that
the confession was admissible.
On appeal by the defendant, 2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
in an opinion written by Chief Judge Reed, assumed that the arrest
and search were illegal, but nevertheless affirmed on the ground that
"the trial court had a factual basis before it from which it could reasonably have found that defendant's [confession] was the result of a voluntary exercise of free will and independent of the illegal search and
seizure."' The court also held, in the alternative, that the information
possessed by Officer Anderson "quite reasonably could be considered
to have constituted probable cause for a search of the vehicle for stolen
goods ' 4 even though that same information "might not have been
sufficient to equate with the 'probable cause' necessary to search a
residence or a business premises .

. . ."5

Based on this assumption of

sufficient probable cause, the court concluded that the search was lawful and, therefore, could not have provided an illegal inducement for
the confession.
The decision in jetmore raises two questions of interest: (a)
whether intervening Mirandawarnings can "purge" from a subsequent
confession the "taint" of prior illegal police conduct; and (b) whether
the quantum of probable cause necessary to support the warrantless
search of a vehicle is less than the quantum of probable cause required
to support the search of a building.
1. 275 So. 2d at 63.
2. The state did not cross-appeal or otherwise challenge the trial court's decision to
suppress the tangible evidence. Id. at 66 (Walden, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 64.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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A.
6
Defendant Jetmore relied on the case of Wong Sun v. United States
to support his contention that the confession should be excluded as a
"fruit of the poisonous tree"; i.e., that the confession was directly induced by the illegal search and seizure. 7 The district court of appeal,
however, also relying on language from Wong Sun, found that the
circumstances surrounding Jetmore's confession did not require application of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule. s
Wong Sun is the major United States Supreme Court treatment of
the matter of confessions that result from illegal police conduct.9 The
test of admissibility was set forth in Wong Sun as follows: "[T]he ...
question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"10 In
6. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
7. See, e.g., id. at 485: "[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest ... is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of the intrusion."
8. 275 So. 2d at 64. The Jetmore court quoted the following passages from Wong Sun:
"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it
would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police." 371 U.S. at 487-88.
"On the evidence that Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful
arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to make the statement, we
hold that the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint."' Id. at 491.
9. Fourth amendment protection was originally extended to prohibit collateral use
of illegally seized evidence in the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne a district attorney was prohibited from using information
obtained from illegally seized books and papers to support the later issuance of otherwise
valid subpoenas for the same books and papers. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, said: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. Justice Holmes recognized, however, that
this principle requires exclusion of evidence only so long as the source of the evidence is
illegal government activity: "Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed." Id. (emphasis added).
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), added a further limitation on the extent of exclusion under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, by stating: "Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through
illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such
connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 341 (emphasis
added).
In Wong Sun the Supreme Court extended Silverthorne and Nardone to exclude
verbal evidence which derives "immediately from an unlawful entry and an unlawful
arrest." 371 U.S. at 485; see note 7 supra.
10. 371 US. at 488.
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Wong Sun, one suspect (Wong) had been released on his own recognizance and had voluntarily returned several days later to confess. Although Wong's original arrest was found to be illegal, it was held that
his confession had been obtained through his own voluntary action and
that any "connection between the arrest and the [confession] had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."' 1 Another suspect (Toy)
had been questioned in his bedroom shortly after the police had made
an illegal entry and arrest. In Toy's case the Supreme Court held that
any statements made by him were to be excluded as not "sufficiently
an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful in-

vasion.

' 12

The problem facing the Jetmore court, in its determination of the
admissibility of the defendant's confession, was whether the point of
sufficient "attenuation" had been reached. In its opinion the court recognized that the admissible confession in Wong Sun had been rendered
"several days later,"'21 whereas there was only a forty-five minute span
between Jetmore's arrest and his confession. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the confession was admissible because it "was quite
obviously given freely and voluntarily and after a full and complete
Miranda warning which the defendant expressly stated he understood." 4
11. Id. at 491; see note 8 supra.
12. 371 U.S. at 486.
13. 275 So. 2d at 64.
14, Id. at 64. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established that certain procedural prerequisites must be complied with by the police in order to preserve the fifth
amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. In general, if the warnings
set forth in Miranda, or their acceptable equivalent, are not given to a suspect who is in
police custody, no statement he makes can be considered the product of a free choice. Id.
at 458. Miranda implies that confessions obtained without these procedural safeguards are
inadmissible because they are involuntary:
In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. ... The fact remains that in none of these cases did
the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.
. . . Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.
Id. at 457-58. But if the Miranda Court intended to redefine for all purposes the definition
of "voluntariness," this result was undone in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The
Court in Harris referred to statements obtained in the absence of Miranda safeguards as
"inadmissible" rather than "involuntary"-and the Court limited the inadmissibility
aspect of such statements to the prosecution's case in chief only, provided that "the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards [including voluntariness]." Id. at 224.
The defendant in Harris made "no claim that the statements made to the police [in the
absence of Miranda warnings] were coerced or involuntary." Id. (emphasis added). The
defendant nevertheless argued that absence of Miranda warnings precluded use of his
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The court cited two cases in support of its conclusion: Reynolds v.
State5 and State v. Oyarzo.1 6 In Reynolds, a brief per curiam opinion
in which the facts are not reported, the Third District Court of Appeal held that "the adequacy of . . . [Miranda] warnings given [a] defendant ... and ... the voluntariness of his confession""7 are issues to
be resolved by the trial court. The Oyarzo case is a more convincing
precedent than Reynolds because it presents facts on point with Jetmore. In Oyarzo the Florida Supreme Court held that even if a first set
of Miranda warnings given the defendant had been vitiated by contemporaneous police misconduct (an assurance of "nothing to fear"),
a second set of warnings, given two hours later by a different officer,
was sufficient to render the defendant's confession voluntary.' s In view
of the reliance it places on Oyarzo, it is apparent that the Jetmore court
gave substantial weight to the effect of the Miranda warnings as insulating Jetmore's confession from the taint of the prior illegal search.1 9
The court did not explicitly consider what the necessary elements
of a free will confession are in the case of a confession that has been
preceded by illegal police conduct.20 In terms of the spatial and temstatements even for impeachment purposes. The Court rejected this argument, adding:
"The voluntariness of the confession would, on this thesis, be totally irrelevant. We reject
such an extravagant extension of the Constitution." Id. at 225 n.2 (emphasis added). Thus
at least for collateral uses such as impeachment, and perhaps even in regard to the
prosecution's case in chief, a failure to observe the Miranda safeguards does not preclude
a determination that such statements are "voluntary." In regard to the prosecution's case
in chief, Miranda would simply raise an additional hurdle for such statements to be
admissible.
15. 222 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
16. 274 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1973).
17. 222 So. 2d at 246.
18. 274 So. 2d at 520.
19. In French v. State, 198 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), defendants were
arrested following an illegal police search of their persons which revealed stolen property.
The defendants confessed "within a very short time of the unlawful search and seizure."
Id. at 669. The confessions were suppressed. The dissent in Jetmore concluded that the
only distinguishing factor between French and Jetmore was that in French there was no
indication that the defendants had been given Miranda warnings. 275 So. 2d at 67.
20. A general standard for determining voluntariness of a statement was formulated
in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897), as follows:
The rule is not that in order to render a statement admissible the proof must be
adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a statement were voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to establish that the
making of the statement was voluntary; that is to say, that from the causes, which
the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused hope or
fear in respect to the crime charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled to
make a statement, when but for the improper influence he would have remained
silent.
This standard was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
462 (1966).
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poral separation between the illegal search and the confession, it is
clear that Jetmore's confession, when compared to the facts in Wong
Sun, more resembles the inadmissible statement of Toy than the admissible statement of Wong. Since Jetmore was never out of police
custody, there was no spatial separation to insulate him from the effects
of the illegal search. It also seems unlikely that the temporal factor, the
forty-five minute span between Jetmore's arrest and his confession, was
highly significant.2' It therefore seems implicit in the court's decision
that the intervention of the valid Miranda warnings was, on the facts
of the case, the primary factor in finding that the confession was voluntary and, consequently, that the nexus between the illegal search and
22
the confession had been sufficiently attenuated.
It is unfortunate that the court did not delineate more clearly the
weight Miranda warnings are to be given in the context of insulating a
confession from prior illegal police conduct.2 3 It seems likely that the
court will eventually have to confront a situation where a confession
follows an illegal search after a still shorter interval than that in jetmore, or where the search, Miranda warnings and confession occur in
24

immediate succession.

Logical extension of the reasoning in Jetmore would result in a
rule that Miranda warnings in themselves can purge the taint of virtually contemporaneous police misconduct.2 5 One of the more important situations to which such a rule would apply is that in which
police confront a suspect with illegally seized evidence,26 impress upon
21. See note 19 supra.
22. For a contrary view, minimizing the importance of Miranda warnings where a
defendant has been confronted with illegally obtained evidence, see People v. Johnson,
450 P.2d 865, 870-71, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-07 (1969), stating:
The Miranda warnings advise a defendant of his rights to remain silent and to
counsel. They do not advise him whether the evidence he is confronted with is unlawfully obtained or whether it will be admissible at trial.
There is little, if any reason, to assume that the Miranda warning neutralizes
the inducement to confess furnished by the confrontation of the defendant with the
illegally obtained evidence which shows his guilt and the futility of remaining silent.
If Miranda warnings were held to insulate from the exclusionary rule confessions
induced by unlawfully obtained evidence, the police would be encouraged to make
illegal searches in the hope of obtaining confessions after Miranda warnings even
though the actual evidence seized might later be found inadmissible.
23. See id. at 877-78, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14, where the dissent would hold that valid
Miranda warnings in themselves provide the required "break in the causal chain" linking
the illegality and the confession.
24. It is arguable that jetmore itself is a step in this direction; the effective "attenuation interval" has been shortened from the two hour span in State v. Oyarzo, 274 So. 2d
519 (Fla. 1973), to the forty-five minute interval in Jetmore.
25. See note 23 supra.
26. On the issue of confronting a suspect with illegally obtained evidence see French
v. State, 198 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967): "Statements made by a de-
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him the futility of his situation 2 7 give Miranda warnings and then

hope for a confession. 28 If Miranda warnings, which were originally
devised to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surround-

ings,"2 9 are eventually held to insulate, automatically, a confession
from the coercive effects of such a confrontation with illegally seized
evidence,3 0 the police may be "encouraged to make illegal searches in
the hope of obtaining confessions after Miranda warnings even though
the actual evidence seized might later be found inadmissible."31 Thus
the rationale of Jetmore, if extended, may lead to an erosion of the

fendant when confronted by the police with the fruits of an illegal search constitute 'the
fruit of the poisonous tree' and are inadmissible in evidence." In French no Miranda
warnings had been given to the defendant. See note 19 supra. There is dictum in Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1963), to the effect that a confession induced by confrontation with illegally seized evidence would be tainted and excludable. Fahy was decided before Miranda v. Arizona.
27. On the issue of police "pressure" exerted on a suspect see Paramore v. State, 229
So. 2d 855, 858 (Fla. 1969):
A confession of guilt freely and voluntarily made is not rendered inadmissible
because it appears to be induced . . . by the accused being told it would be easier
on him if he told the truth . . . or by an officer's statement that only by confessing
could the defendant escape the death penalty.
Cf. State v. Kitashiro, 397 P.2d 558, 566 (Hawaii 1964):
Thus the illegally seized automobile parts were used to instill in defendant a
realization of the hopelessness of his situation. He was left to meditate on it for
about three hours, while the corrosive properties of the poison so instilled had their
intended effect. We cannot agree with the State's contention that during this interval
the taint of the illegal search and seizure became dissipated.
28. This may have been the sequence of events which gave rise to the confession in
Jetmore itself. See 275 So. 2d at 66 (Walden, J., dissenting), where the following is quoted
from the defendant's testimony at trial:
Q "What happened at the police station?
A "They kept asking me if I would make a confession and the one in plain clothes,
one man in plain clothes, he told me that I might as well make a statement,
they had the evidence on me, that there wouldn't be no need for me to hold
out, now, they would convict me no matter what.
I come to the conclusion where they kept saying they had the evidence
whether they made [a statement] or whether I made one or not, they still would
convict me. I finally gave up."
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
30. Confrontation with legally seized evidence has been held not to render a confession
involuntary. State v. Smith, 277 A.2d 481 (Me. 1971). As a practical matter, a suspect does
not know whether evidence has been legally or illegally seized. Consequently, the psychological coercion exerted by a confrontation with illegally seized evidence should be no
different from that exerted by a confrontation with legally seized evidence. In a situation
where a suspect is confronted with illegally seized evidence, it may therefore be more
theoretically proper to say that the Miranda warnings insulate the confrontation from the
taint of the prior illegal police conduct, than to say that the warnings insulate the confession from the coercive effects of the confrontation.
31. People v. Johnson, 450 P.2d 865, 871, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1969).
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deterrent function which the "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary
32
rule was originally designed to serve.
B.
The court in Jetmore held, in the alternative, that the original
search was supported by sufficient probable cause and thus fell within
the doctrine of Carroll v. United States.3 The rule announced in Carroll was that the search of motor vehicles could take place without a
warrant if "the seizing officer [has] reasonable or probable cause for
believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband
...therein which is being illegally transported." 3' 4 The Carroll Court
found that the mobility which is characteristic of automobiles makes
warrantless searches of them, if based on probable cause, reasonable in
circumstances where a warrantless search of a dwelling would be unreasonable.3 5
32. The primary rationale behind any exclusionary rule is deterrence of illegal government conduct which infringes on a suspect's constitutional rights. "The [exclusionary]
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). However, two
distinct lines of authority in regard to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine have
been developed by state and lower federal courts that have interpreted Wong Sun. See
Note, Admissibility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest: Wong Sun v.
United States Revisited, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 207 (1970). The first line of authority
emphasizes that the deterrent factor alone should dictate when the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" exclusionary rule is to be applied. These cases would hold that all evidence, including confessions, obtained subsequent to illegal police conduct must be excluded. See,
e.g., Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963); People v. Johnson, 450 P.2d
865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969); People v. Sesslin, 439 P.2d 321, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1968).
The second line of authority after Wong Sun has emphasized that "voluntariness" and
"causation" should dictate when the exclusionary rule is to be applied. These cases
would admit a "voluntary" confession despite any prior police conduct. See, e.g., United
States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 992 (1965); State v. Kitashiro,
397 P.2d 558 (Hawaii 1964); State v. Moore, 166 S.E.2d 53 (N.C. 1969).
The jetmore decision not only accepts "voluntariness" as the key to admissibility, but
implies that the giving of Miranda warnings after illegal police conduct will virtually
guarantee the "voluntariness" of the subsequent confession. The court does not consider
the effect of such a rule on the deterrence rationale behind the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" exclusionary rule.
33. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
34. Id. at 156. The Carroll decision has been incorporated into Florida statutory law.
FLA. STAT. § 933.19 (1971).
35. 267 U.S. at 153. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Supreme Court
emphasized that the Carroll exception to the warrant requirement was based on the
mobility which is characteristic of automobiles. The Chambers Court also "insisted upon

probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the
Constitution." Id. at 50-51; see note 41 infra. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443, 458-60 (1971).
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973), the Supreme Court observed that a
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In Jetmore the trial court had granted the motion to suppress the
tangible evidence obtained in the original search of the automobile.,"
The district court of appeal, on the other hand, ruled that the facts of
the case revealed sufficient probable cause to support the search, by
stating:
While the totality of the information in the officer's possession at this
time might not have been sufficient to equate with the "probable
cause" necessary to search a residence or a business premises, it quite
reasonably could be considered to have constituted probable cause for

37
a search of the vehicle for stolen goods.

The appellate court did not detail the extent to which less probable
cause will be accepted for the search of an automobile than for the
search of a building. Probably no precise guidelines can be given.1s
warrantless search of an automobile by state officers may be justified on grounds other
than the mobility characteristic. The Court remarked upon the difference in operations
of federal and state officers in relation to automobiles. "The contact with vehicles by
federal law enforcement officers usually, if not always, involves the detection or investigation of crimes unrelated to the operation of a vehicle." Id. at 2527. "[S]tate and local
police officers, unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for reasons
related to the operation of vehicles themselves." Id. at 2528. Local contact is often noncriminal in nature, involving activities such as accident investigations and supervision of
abandoned vehicles. These activities, described by the Court as "community caretaking
functions," id., often require intrusion into areas such as the trunk of an automobile for
the purpose of safeguarding the owner's property, guaranteeing the safety of the custodians, or protecting the immediate general public-any "one of the recurring practical
situations that [result] from the operation of motor vehicles and with which local police
officers must deal every day." Id. at 2530. This "extensive and often noncriminal contact
with automobiles . . . [often] bring[s] local officials in 'plain view' of evidence, fruits, or
instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband"; accordingly, "warrantless searches of vehicles
by state officers have been sustained in cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle being
removed or evidence in it being destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent." Id. at 2528.
The Dombrowski Court thus defined a category of automobile intrusions that satisfies
the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness without the existence of probable
cause; but this category is limited to situations involving "community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating
to the violation of a criminal statute." Id. The search of Jetmore's automobile, however,
was admittedly made in the course of an investigation of a breaking and entering. 275
So. 2d at 63. And nowhere does the Dombrowski Court intimate that less probable cause
is required for the warrantless search of an automobile on suspicion of criminal activity
than is required for a similar search of residence or business premises. See note 41 infra.
36. 275 So. 2d at 62.
37. Id. at 64. On appeal the state did not challenge the trial court's ruling that the
search was illegal. Recognizing this, Judge Walden stated in his dissent that the trial
court's resolution of the issue of the legality of the search could not properly be "challenge[d], or change[d], or contort[ed] in some kind of effort to support the appealed trial
court decision regarding the use of the confession." Id. at 66.
38. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1947), stating: "The troublesome line posed by the facts in the Carroll case and this case is one between mere

FloridaState University Law Review

[Vol. 1

When determining whether a man of "reasonable caution" could have
believed that an automobile was carrying contraband, it is clear that
courts are influenced by the fact that automobiles are often used to
commit crimes and by the fact that officers often will have only a fleeting chance to search an automobile.39 In Jetmore, however, the court
seems to go beyond the mere incorporation of these facts into the
ultimate determination of probable cause, and by doing so, the decison may undermine the protection afforded by the Carroll requirement of probable cause to search. The rule which seems to be put
forth in Jetmore is that a warrantless search of an automobile is legal
where there is probable cause to search, even though the quantum of
probable cause present is less than that required for the search of a
building.4 0 The introduction of this new element of "less probable
cause" does not seem to be supported by United States Supreme Court
41
discussions of the requirement of probable cause.
suspicion and probable cause. That line necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment
formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken of all circumstances ......

39. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970). See Murray & Aitken,
Constitutional Limitations on Automobile Searches, 3 LoYoLA U.L.JL. RLy. 95, 103-06
(1970), for examples of "suspicious behavior" which in California have been held to con-

stitute sufficient probable cause to search an automobile.
40.

Cf. Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864, 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959):
As a necessary and proper evolution of the living law to meet the changing needs
of society, the modern trend of authority is to narrow the concept of immunity

against searches and seizures when it involves a motor vehicle used as an aid to the
commission of crimes, whether in transporting the criminal or the fruit of the crime.
This trend is reflected by the acceptance of less compelling facts and circumstances
than formerly required to constitute "probable cause" for an arrest of the driver or
occupant, or for search of vehicles and seizure of property found therein without

supporting warrants.
See also State v. Miller, 267 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). It is highly questionable whether this "trend" is supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. See note 41 infra.

41. It is true that the Supreme Court has stated that in search and seizure cases the
"Court has long distinguished between an automobile and a home or office." Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970). Such a distinction has been seized upon in some Florida
cases to justify lowering the standard of probable cause required to search an automobile.
See, e.g., Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864, 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In order to
properly interpret the distinction made by the Supreme Court, however, it is necessary
to recall that there are two general constitutional prerequisites for a valid search: the
search must be supported by probable cause, and the search must be reasonable. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. Generally, a search must be supported by a warrant in order to be
reasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. 102 (1965). In certain exigent situations, however, the Court has recognized that
warrantless searches can be reasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra (seizure of
evidence in plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (search while in "hot pursiut'); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (need to prevent destruction of evidence); Cf. Cady v.
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The decision in Jetmore, if followed, may cause two distinct lines
of cases to develop: one defining "automobile-search probable cause"
and another defining "probable cause generally." Given the inherent
elusiveness of even the strictest conception of "probable cause," the
introduction of a "lesser probable cause" standard in automobile cases
may result in relaxation of that fundamental element of fourth amendment protection, thus leaving the highway traveler "at the mercy of
the officers' whim or caprice. "42
Dombrowski, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973) (warrantless searches of automobiles reasonable in
situations involving "community caretaking functions").
The Carroll-type automobile cases represent another one of these exigent situations.
The issue in these cases is not whether less probable cause is necessary to search the
vehicle, but whether the search can be valid without a warrant. Thus it is on the warrant
issue, not on the probable cause issue, that the Supreme Court has distinguished between
automobiles and buildings. "In terms of circumstances justifying a warrantless search, the
Court has long distinguished between an automobile and a home or office." Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (emphasis added). "[S]earches of cars that are constantly movable
may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although the result
might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property."
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (emphasis added).
In no automobile case has the Court indicated that the exigent circumstances justify
a lessening of the probable cause requirement. As stated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
at 51: "In enforcing the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement ....
Carroll . . .holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause to search
the automobile stopped on the highway." Or, as summarized in Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968):
Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a warrant upon
facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office . . . . The cases so
holding have, however, always insisted that the officer conducting the search have
"reasonable or probable cause" to believe that they will find the instrumentality of
a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless
search.
The Carroll Court itself, when defining probable cause, did not distinguish between the
quantum of probable cause necessary in an automobile case and the quantum necessary
in other cases. This is apparent from the fact that in framing its definition of probable
cause the Carroll Court relied on cases "justifying seizures on land or sea, in making
arrests without warrants for past felonies, and in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment cases." 267 U.S. at 161.
42. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). The full quotation reads as
follows:
It is basic that an arrest with or without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground
than mere suspicion . . . though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence
which would suffice to convict. The quantum of information which constitutes
probable cause-evidence which would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief" that a felony has been committed, Carroll v. United States, . . .- must be
measured by the facts of the particular case. The history of the use, and not infrequent abuse, of the power to arrest cautions that a relaxation of the fundamental
requirements of probable cause would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of
the officers' whim or caprice."
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HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES.

By Dan B. Dobbs., St. Paul,

Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1973. Pp. 1067. $15.00. (Hornbook Series.)
2
Reviewed by Lawrence C. George

One who is ill consults a doctor and is prescribed a remedy; improvement or recovery will only probably warrant the patient's attributing the change to the remedy. The patient (and the FDA in
issuing the license for the chemical's prescription if a drug is involved)
makes an inference, a leap of faith, in equating medical remedies with
cures. Montaigne wrote that throughout most of the history of medical
science no one but the most credulous fool would think of a "remedy"
as a likely help, much less a cure.3 The word's connotation was closer
to the ideas still conveyed by such pejorative terms as "nostrum" and
"panacea." Today a suitor who seeks from a member of the legal
profession relief plainly promised by settled principles of decisional or
statutory law is likely to have the same attitude about the efficacy and
the cost of his legal "remedies" as Montaigne had about medical
remedies four centuries ago-if he thinks of the term "remedy" at all
in connection with his recourse to the courts.
Even within the legal profession there is a certain awkwardness
about appropriating such a therapeutic term as "remedy" to the variety
of relief sought in that part of the complaint aptly termed a prayer.
Law is more a sundering than a healing art, and it seems disingenuous
to steal the thunder of a sister profession, even if medicine's reputation
is a windfall from recent progress in biochemistry4 But law's title to
"remedies" is as strong and as old as medicine's. As a purely human and
1. Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.
2. Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
3. "Who ever saw a doctor use the prescription of his colleague without cutting out
or adding something? Thereby they clearly enough betray their art and reveal to us that
they consider their reputation, and consequently their profit, more than the interest of
their patients .... ." Montaigne, Of the Resemblance of Children to Fathers, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE 584 (Frame transl. 1958). "If we were even assured that

when they make a mistake it would not harm us, even though it did not benefit us, it
would be a very reasonable bargain to risk acquiring some gain without putting oneself
in danger of loss." Id. at 586.
4. Dean Sherman M. Mellinkoff, M.D., of the U.C.LA. Medical School, writes: "At
the beginning of the 20th century there were only about six reliable and effective
pharmaceutical preparations, namely digitalis (still helpful in many kinds of heart
disease), morphine, quinine (for malaria), diphtheria antitoxin, aspirin, and ether. Two
other successful means of chemical intervention were also available: immunization
against smallpox and rabies. This pharmacopoeia remained basically unchanged until
about the time of World War II." Mellinkoff, Chemical Intervention, SCIENTIFIC AM.,
Sept. 1973, at 103.
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social artifact, law has the further claim that its remedies, in principle,
could someday, somehow, in the real world become 100 percent effectual. Professor Dobbs does not need such a utopian jurisprudential
stand, however, to justify his lucid and lively new Hornbook. He starts
with a large, diversified basis of given data, amounting to little less
than the entire set of prima facie cases that private litigants can set
forth in the pursuit of legal damages or equitable relief (or, within
the American scheme, some combination of the two), and he theorizes
and analyses the choices available, keeping in view the historically determined variety of judicial responses. The subject of remedies is thus
both comprehensive and complex almost beyond management of a
single mind because it originates from a composite of doctrines, each
of whose initial formulation occupies a large proportion of the mental
energies of bench, bar and academy.
Remedies is a perplexing and protean subject for independent legal
study, whether in a textbook or in a traditional legal curriculum. It
has the desirable status of being residuary legatee of all the good intentions of the usual courses in trusts, equity, contracts, torts and the rest
-a gathering place for the general principles that underlie the computation of monetary damages, for the historical principles that determine
when other kinds of relief than monetary damages may be available,
for the nitty-gritty of per diem or blackboard damages for pain and
suffering, and for the sublime esoterica of the rule(s) that derive from
Clayton's Case.5 But this eclectic legacy causes remedies to suffer from
an overbreadth that is evident in the enormous number of cross-referencing footnotes in Professor Dobbs' well-organized, cogent text. Even
more, remedies suffers from complexity and imprecision. Student and
teacher alike are forced unceremoniously to the realization that there
is no legal penicillin. Every course of action is beset with serious sideeffects: free choice becomes "an election," pursuit of one theory becomes a waiver of others, and estoppel becomes a pitfall to trap the
weary convalescent just as he thinks the crisis is passed.
Members of the legal profession are commonly myopic. They often
fail to see that from the viewpoint of the man in the street, the citizen
Edmond Cahn called the "consumer" of justice, 6 "going to law" is a
poor remedy. Only at substantial expense of both personal treasure and
5. Devaynes v. Noble, 1 Mer. 572 (1816). The case is discussed most learnedly in
McConville, Tracing and the Rule in Clayton's Case, 79 L.Q. REV. 388 (1963), reprinted
and abridged in K. YoRK & J. BAUMAN, REMEDIES 351-57 (1967). The McConville article,
itself expository, is a difficult matter for most students, and Professor Dobbs performs an
invaluable service in distilling its salient points and making the American progeny of
the English case recognizable, if not entirely legitimate.
6.

See E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT or DEMOCATIC MAN ch. 2 (1961),
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peace of mind are the most sacred promises of the legal order made
good. Surely one of the most remarkable features of the American law
of remedies is its resolute refusal to consider legal fees part of the
remedy to which prevailing clients are entitled. Professor Dobbs is not
insensitive to this and similar (irremediable?) defects of civil litigation
as a social institution. 7 Two of his text's greatest merits are the clarity
of its explanations of the accidental and contingent sources of many of
our troubles, and the persuasive arguments against such anachronistic
survivals as the doctrine of "election of remedies. ' 8 Still, the battles
that Professor Dobbs wages are always small, well-suited to the case-bycase approach of a legal system rooted in stare decisis and to the needs
of a student or practitioner seeking information about a concrete point
of "remedial" law.
But the rub comes when research is begun with a definite and keynumerable point of law in mind. Using Professor Dobbs' textbook is
like consulting a dictionary in which every definition raises a new point
requiring further definition until finally the entire dictionary is covered. There is something inescapably procrustean in the effort to deal
with a field that is the intersection of a variety of fairly well-established
legal doctrines. Remedies invites, and almost requires, theorizing about
the meaning and role of the doctrines, of the formulations, and of the
distillations that comprise such successful companion textbooks as
Prosseron Torts.
This is of course a familiar complaint to anyone who has tried to
unravel law's seamless web just far enough to isolate and resolve a discrete problem; the artificiality of categories also besets Prosser's established text, and it greatly complicates the American Law Institute's
unending task of restatemanship. When these basic difficulties are compounded by the need to explain the whys and wherefores of choosing
one doctrine over another, the advantage of a systematic approach to
the common-law oriented American legal tradition is easily perceived.
Professor Dobbs shows a mastery of the traditional, case-oriented, compile-and-comment method of legal exposition that marks him as a true
virtuoso of the caliber of a Corbin or a Prosser. He obviously possesses
7. See § 3.8, at 194, of the Hornbook and more particularly the balanced discussion
of the arguments pro and con on the financing of litigation set forth in the subsection
starting on p. 200, in which Professor Dobbs remarks: "It is ironic, to say the least, that
such a motivation [the anti-lawyer attitude prevalent in colonial and revolutionary America] would result in making courts inaccessible, or at best, a losing enterprise for most
Americans." The treatment of the economics of litigation is one of the most felicitous
parts of the Hornbook, both for its scholarly level and for its careful and provocative
assessment of the various ways counsel can include the costs of his services in the ultimate
recovery without fully imposing that burden on his client.
8. The discussion is principally found in § 1.5 of the Hornbook.
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a sound and comprehensive, but always implicit, jurisprudential theory
that determines his criticism and his choice of sub-themes within the
larger canvas unfortunately laid out by long tradition. What is wanted
is a more open and tendentious avowal of the theories implicit in the
treatment given the several issues and an organization that is more directly and unashamedly normative.
Philosophical criticism seems terribly misplaced in dealing with
such a practical and unpretentious contribution to knowledge as a
Hornbook, the function of which is to settle issues, not to raise them.
It is instructive to examine a very small sample of the discussion of
remedial problems in Professor Dobbs' text. The sample is chosen for
typicality and excellence. The purpose of this excursion is to consider
whether a subject as problematical, by definition, as remedies may suffer so far in the translation of leading cases into terms of purely legal
doctrine as to deprive the text of practical usefulness either as a leader
of judicial opinion or an elucidator of important policy issues.
A perennial problem of law occurring in most nonprimitive societies concerns the mendacious middleman. Professor Dobbs provides
a model of scholarly edification, diffidence and brevity in discussing the
most perplexing and amusing form of this problem in the contemporary United States. The discussion is found in a section titled "The
Broker's Profit Cases" (pp. 686-89). It begins with a helpful schematic
reduction of the issue to its minimal juridical elements: P, a principal
with some real estate to sell; A, his agent (commonly known as broker);
and T, a third party who wants to buy the property. The problem is
not what A can get away with vist-vis his principal but rather how A
can be made to deal fairly with T despite the principal's apparent satisfaction with a raw deal. Fine examples of the problem are found in the
two fascinating cases of Ward v. Taggart9 and Harper v. Adametz. 10
The briefing of these decisions in Dobbs' text is a perfect model of
accuracy and brevity. Both pose the recurrent problem of an agent
exploiting his inside information that the buyer will pay more (or take
a smaller estate for the same price) and that the seller will take less than
the ostensible terms of sale in order to conclude a bargain. Doctrinal
difficulties arise in granting relief to a buyer who ends up with what
he wanted at or below its fair market value. In the words of Professor
Dobbs:
Although cases of this genre tend to speak in terms of "fraud," or,
as in Ward v. Taggart, prevention of unjust enrichment, it seems
9. 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959).
10. 113 A.2d 136 (Conn. 1955).
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clear that a duty is being imposed upon the broker who has inside information not to misdeal in it. If this is not a fiduciary duty in origin,
it at least resembles such a duty in operation, since it requires both
disclosure and the avoidance of personal profit. Perhaps the underlying policy is that a free market is desirable, and that a free market
cannot work effectively without fair access to basic information. This
coupled with the enrichment of the broker has been enough to tip
the scales in favor of liability. [p. 687]
Amid all the diffidence and scholarly caution of the author's phraseology is a thesis-namely that these cases would be better understood
if the courts rendering the decisions had spoken in traditional tort
terminology. Courts should substitute the letter F, indicating a fiduciary capacity, for the letter A, at least as a description of the relationship
between the buyer and the seller's agent. They should also say as well
as mean that there is a duty to the buyer not to grab up the value of
the margin between the buyer's top price and the seller's bottom one.
There is a further proviso-the duty exists unless the deal between the
seller and his A provided for the A to be paid whatever he could get
out of the buyer over and above the net sale price wanted by the seller.
It would be more (legally) realistic to reduce the Ward and Harper
cases to an even simpler conclusion-namely that a court will not let
a broker get away with such chicanery; the injustice of the enrichment
will outweigh any quibbles about who should be complaining. It is
difficult to see how this very appealing gut reaction is further buttressed
by policy talk about effectiveness of free markets and access to basic
information. If the courts were to indulge policy debate in a case of
first impression, resourceful advocates would surely build a great model
of the virtues and benefits of the broker's role as arbitrageur.The
whole idea that the scales are in near-equipoise on the issue of liability
and that the rather abstruse policy of promoting a free market is needed
to resolve the issue is hard to reconcile with the decidedly colorful and
moralistic reactions of the judges who rendered the decisions and with
the heat these cases readily generate in classroom discussions. In both
Ward and Harper,the broker was an arrant knave. Stronger examples
of the law's acting as the enforcer of business morality are hard to find.
The problem is therefore one of finding an acceptable way to rationalize the needed result in terms of the familiar categories and patterns
of legal doctrine.
There are numerous avenues by which an acceptable rationalization
can be arrived at. Justice Traynor appreciates the flexibility of the
unjust enrichment doctrine, because it is otherwise hard to attribute a
loss to the plaintiff who got full value for his money. Professor Dobbs
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draws the lesson that is manifestly meant to be taught to tempted
brokers everywhere: there is a duty to let the parties to a sale work out
between themselves the balance between their respective willingnesses
to make concessions. The result could also be rationalized as the consequence of a form of equitable substitution of the buyer for the unlitigious seller, thus limiting the buyer's claim to the amount of consideration paid that should have reached the seller's pockets. This
might be a more promising way of reconciling the cases in which the
buyer's claim is based on a simple misrepresentation of the seller's
minimum price. The point here is that doctrinal analysis easily suggests
a variety of legalistic methods that can be used to rationalize a morally
happy result, and it is at best confusing to make such nice distinctions
as are implied in Professor Dobbs' discussion of the relative importance
of "fraud" or "unjust enrichment" as the best single stick with which
to cudgel the thievish broker.
Confusion at the level of legal theory about why it is fair to make
the broker disgorge his gains is certainly no disgrace, and it may be
nothing more than a betrayal of a lack of sufficient subtlety on the part
of the reader. A more serious source of disquietude is the premise from
which Professor Dobbs launches his feats of juristic elegance. The
premise-and the promise-of the careful dissection of cases like Ward
and Harper is that the effort will be repaid in the form of a better
understanding of the nature of "fraud" or "unjust enrichment." Implicit duties will become explicit and basepoints will be acquired for
excursions to the murky regions of law's penumbras. The truth of the
matter may be that if one is willing to pause for a few minutes and
grope for a pretutored sense of fairness the eclipse will pass. A metaphorical way of talking comes naturally to a court that must put words
around the conclusion (judgment for plaintiff buyer) at which it has
little hesitation in arriving. The ultimate scheme for explicating the
relationship between members of the eternal triangle of broker, seller
and buyer may not emerge with algebraic clarity except by noting the
"operational resemblance" between the duty recognized in the law of
tort and the conduct expected of a real estate salesman concerned about
losing a judgment or a license in the circumstances of the Ward and
Harper cases. When it finally becomes clear, the legal response to the
deplorable situation may seem banal and the effort used to reach it
wasted. "A Broker must pay back to the Buyer everything he ends up
with after the Closing except a fair commission from the Seller as
agreed upon in Advance of the transaction" or the like may be the
blackest letters reasonably capable of summarizing the ire and the
lingering doubts about the penal consequences of a doctrine that would
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conceivably leave the hitherto supine seller free to initiate a second
action, on familiar agency principles, to recover once more from the
scoundrel what he had already parted with to the third party. Had
Mr. Harper of Harper v. Adametz not been the renowned Professor of
Torts at Yale Law School perhaps Mr. Tesar, the seller, might have
been aroused to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds of that historic litigation, thereby settling many a riddle and
theoretic doubt.
The artificiality of the foregoing discussion is a reductio ad absurdum of the method of textual analysis invited by the objective and
the format of the Hornbook. The aim of these books is to simplify and
identify elements having a common bearing on the proper decision of
typical cases. In a technical, juristic sense, this aim is unrealistic. In a
practical sense, too, there are grave risks of seeming to be pedantically
naive in approaching the law's developments as if remedies did not
have a paramount influence in the formulation of doctrines (with all
that that implies about the judicial morality of ends and means) instead
of approaching cases as if the settled principles determine the situation
in which a remedy will be given. The lesson that emerges most clearly
from an overview of the cases and from the authorities dealing with
the subject is that remedies needs a more utopian, normative and systematic critique of what is expected and what is required from private
law as it presently operates in this most legalistic of countries. Professor
Dobbs seems eminently suited to the task, and it is hoped his future
emendations of this valuable text will show more boldness as the
authority of his readings becomes increasingly well-established.
Departure from the accepted genre of the Hornbook is particularly
defensible for remedies because the only way to be practical in approaching the subject is to treat it as the area par excellence for considering the relevance of "purely" legal, formal, doctrinal (and to be
honestly pejorative, doctrinaire) formulae of the kind exemplified in
such authoritative monuments as the Restatements of the Law. Black
letters belong in a study of remedies; indeed they bear more fundamentally on its subject matter than the doctrine of consideration, for
example, bears on the study of contract-but that is all the better
reason to adopt and scrupulously to maintain a certain careful attitude
toward the black letters, a certain sophistication about the reasons for
their parochial importance that is too easily compromised by following
the established pattern of the Hornbook series.
On the whole, Professor Dobbs has managed supremely well the
difficult task of telling all that we didn't know and were afraid to ask
about the rule in Clayton's Case as well as about "the nature of" restitu-
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tion as a fundamental juridical concept. It is exciting to see the birth of
a textbook that fills needs so forthrightly and so comfortably as this
Hornbook. Future editions will surely bring further refinements and
some simplification of organization, but this edition will be memorable
for establishing its author as the most prestigious proprietor of a very
important and long-neglected field of legal study.

